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The Idaho Department of Administration ("IDA"), J. Michael Gwartney, and Jack G. 
Zickau (collectively, the "State Respondents") submit this Reply to the briefing filed by Syringa 
Networks, LLC ("Syringa") in response to two issues raised by the State Respondents in their 
opening brief: Syringa's lack of standing and the State Respondents' entitlement to attorney 
fees. 
Regarding the first issue, Syringa fails to offer any substantive response to the State 
Respondents' argument that it lacks standing because it was not a bidder. Syringa acknowledges 
that it cannot have standing to challenge IDA's contract award absent statutory authorization, yet 
the only statute to which Syringa points does not confer standing. a result, Syringa has failed 
to identify any basis upon which it has standing to bring counts two and three against the IDA. 
This Court should affirm the dismissal of such counts, consistent with the Legislature's intent to 
limit standing to actual bidders. 
As for attorney fees, Syringa's response has narrowed and clarified the issue for this 
Court to address. On that issue, there can be no question that Syringa is wrong. Syringa's sole 
argument is that Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and § 12-121 were effectively preempted by § 12-117, 
per this Court's proclamation regarding the exclusivity of Idaho Code § 12-117 in Potlatch Educ. 
Ass 'n v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). Notably, Syringa does 
not dispute that, if§ 12-117 does not preempt§ 12-120(3) i.e., if§ 12-120(3) still applies in a 
civil proceeding involving a state agency-- the State Respondents are entitled to an award of 
attorney fees against Syringa. As a result, the sole issue for this Court is whether § 12-117 
preempts either or both of§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. Given that the District Court and Syringa 
each relied solely on Potlatch (and decisions echoing Potlatch) the issue squarely before this 
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Court is whether Potlatch's proclamation regarding the exclusivity of§ 12-117 was a correct 
statement of the law. Because the State Respondents believe that§ 12-117 cannot possibly be 
the exclusive basis for attorney fees in civil cases involving state agencies due to other statutes 
allowing attorney fees, this appeal requires this Court to revisit how § 12-117 interacts with other 
attorney fee provisions in the Idaho Code. In particular, this Court should clarify that, consistent 
with the unambiguous statutory language and clear legislative intent (and numerous pre-Potlatch 
decisions from this Court),§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 --or at least§ 12-120(3) --continue to 
apply in cases involving state agencies and political subdivisions. And, in particular, § 12-
120(3) applies here and compels an award of attorney fees in favor of the State Respondents both 
at the trial level and on appeal. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Syringa Lacks Standing to Bring Counts Two and Three of its Complaint Because 
the Legislature has Granted Standing to Challenge IDA Bid Awards to Bidders 
Only. 
Syringa offers only a terse, ineffectual response to the State Respondents' argument that 
Syringa lacks standing to bring counts 2 and 3 because it was not a bidder. As a result, Syringa 
fails to provide any substantive response. 
1. Syringa has Failed to Identify Any Statutory Grant of Standing. 
In their opening brief, the State Respondents explained the law of standing in the context 
of government contracting, generally, and, in particular, with respect to potential challenges to 
IDA's bid awards. The State Respondents described how a disappointed bidder has no standing 
to challenge a government bid award absent authorizing legislation, how Idaho has provided for 
such challenges in limited circumstances pursuant to I.C. § 67-5733, and how Syringa, as a 
potential subcontractor to a bidder -- rather than a bidder itself-- was not authorized by that 
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section to challenge IDA's bid awards and therefore lacked standing. In response, Syringa does 
not dispute that it lacks standing under§ 67-5733, nor that it was anything more than a 
subcontractor.l Syringa does not contend that the State Respondents' exposition of the law 
regarding standing to challenge govenm1ent bid awards was wrong. Indeed, Syringa accepts that 
it must point to a statute granting it standing, and it points to one -- and only one -- statute, Idaho 
Code § 1 0-1202.~ 
Syringa's reliance on§ 10-1202 is misplaced, however, for two reasons. First, setting 
aside issues of standing, Syringa fails to make a reasoned argument that § 10-1202 otherwise 
applies in these circumstances. Syringa merely asserts that it is a "person" under I.C. § 10-1202 
because, "as a subcontractor to ENA, it incurred an admitted injury in fact that is directly related 
to the unlawful split ofthe lEN project." Response at 5. Even if Syringa is such a "person"--
and the State Respondents do not concede that it is--§ 10-1202 only provides for a declaratory 
judgment to determine a "question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, 
statute, ordinance, contract or franchise .... " Syringa fails to identify how counts two and three 
of its Complaint come within the limitations of§ 10-1202. And it is not at all evident how the 
1 Whether Syringa is properly considered a subcontractor or a potential subcontractor is of no 
moment in the standing analysis -- either way, Syringa was not within the ambit of § 67-
5733, which by its terms applies only to a "vendor whose bid is considered" because Syringa 
admits that it did not submit a bid. Syringa's Opening Brief at 32. For this reason, and in the 
interest of brevity, the State Respondents present this argument as if Syringa was actually a 
subcontractor of ENA rather than merely a potential subcontractor. The State Respondents 
continue to maintain, however, that Syringa was merely a potential subcontractor of ENA, 
and to the extent that this Court finds the difference between subcontractors and potential 
subcontractors meaningful with regards to its standing analysis, the State Respondents urge 
the Court to conclude that Syringa was merely the lattter. Of course, the State Repondents' 
argument that Syringa lacks standing even if it was a subcontractor applies with even more 
force if Syringa was merely a potential subcontractor. 
~Syringa's statement that neither Qwest nor ENA dispute Syringa's standing is a non-sequitir. 
- 3-
01152.0105.5082477.2 
act that Syringa complains of the supposed "unlawful split of the IEN project"-- raises a 
"question of construction or validity" under § 10-1202. 
Second, even if§ 10-1202 applies to Syringa, it does not provide it with a basis for 
standing. Although § 10-1202 "bestows the authority to declare rights, status, or other legal 
relations, that authority is circumscribed by the rule that 'a declaratory judgment can only be 
rendered in a case where an actual or justiciable controversy exists."' Schneider v. Howe, 142 
Idaho 767, 772, 133 P. 3d 1232, 1237 (2006) (quoting Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 
516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984)). Because standing is a sub-category of the question of 
justiciability, id., the authority bestowed by§ 10-1202 is circumscribed by the requirement that a 
litigant demonstrate that it has standing. Put another way, § 10-1202 "does not relieve a party 
from showing that it has standing to bring the action in the first instance." .Martin v. Camas 
County, 150 Idaho 508, 513, 248 P.3d 1243, 1248 (2011) (quoting Schneider, 142 Idaho at 772, 
133 P.3d at 1237). Nor does it permit a party to circumvent the administrative process. See 
Westway Constr., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho 107, 115, 73 P.3d 721, 729 (2003) 
("Actions for declaratory judgment, or to recover damages, are not a substitute for statutory 
administrative procedure ... " ). Syringa's claims against the IDA are simply not justiciable. 
ITlJury. 
2. Syringa's Reliance on the Generalized Constitutional Standing Inquiry and 
its Alleged Injury is Misplaced. 
Syringa nevertheless argues that it has standing because, it asserts, it has suffered an 
assuming, arguendo, that Syringa was injured, its argument for standing misses the 
point because it focuses solely on the general requirements for constitutional standing. In the 
specific context of a challenge to IDA's award of a contract-- as opposed to, for instance, an 
agency's promulgation of a generally applicable rule -- a showing of particularized injury is 
insufficient for standing. Indeed, it is not even the relevant inquiry. Rather, the relevant inquiry 
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is whether Congress, or the state legislature, as the case may be, has granted standing by statute, 
because, in the absence of such an authorizing statute, there is no standing. See State 
Respondents' Opening Brief at 10-12. 
a) The Idaho Legislature has Granted Standing to Challenge IDA Bid 
Awards Only to Bidders. 
In Idaho, the only parties upon whom the Legislature has conferred standing to challenge 
a contract award by IDA are vendors whose bids were considered, and only then after such 
bidders have exhausted the administrative remedies provided in§ 67-5733. In other words, only 
statutorily authorized entities may challenge IDA contract awards, and the only such entities in 
Idaho are the bidders themselves. 
The Idaho Legislature has specifically granted standing to different entities to challenge 
different IDA actions. In§ 67-5733, the Legislature created specific mechanisms for challenges 
to IDA's actions related to government contracting. That section provides for both pre- and post-
award challenges by certain enumerated parties: "any vendor, qualified and able to sell or supply 
the items" can challenge bid specifications, § 67-5733(1)(a), but only a "vendor whose bid is 
considered"-- i.e., a bidder-- can challenge the actual award of the bid itself,§ 67-5733(1)(c). 
For both pre- and post-award challenges, § 67-5733 also sets forth a particular mechanism for 
making an administrative appeal, including specified time limits. 
Together with § 67-5729, § 67-5733 lays out the only route to the courthouse for a party 
seeking to challenge IDA actions taken in connection with government contracting. Section 67-
5729 expressly limits judicial review to "appeals conducted as contested cases pursuant to 
section 67-5733(1)(c)(iii), Idaho Code." Therefore, because only a bidder can initiate an appeal 
under § 67 -5733(1 )(c), only a bidder has standing to challenge government contracting decisions 
in a court of law, and then, only after it has exhausted its administrative remedies. See Fieldturf, 
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Inc. v. State, 140 Idaho 385, 388, 94 P.3d 690, 693 (2004) (holding that bidder "waived its right 
to contest the process by failing to follow both procedures for contesting errors, inconsistencies, 
and ambiguities within the bidding documents and by failing to follow the statutory appeal 
process [in § 67-5733] to challenge the bid documents or DPW's determination"). 
Idaho Code§ 67-5729 also provides standing for intervenors, but again limits that 
standing to actual bidders. In the event a determinations officer is appointed under§ 67-5733 in 
response to an appeal by a bidder, other bidders shall "have standing to intervene in the 
proceeding as a party .... " I.C. § 67-5729. 
Sections 67-5729 and 67-5733 together limit standing to bidders who either initiate an 
administrative appeal under§ 67-5733 or who wish to intervene after another bidder has initiated 
such an appeal. Either way, only a "vendor whose bid is considered" has standing to challenge 
IDA's award of a contract, consistent with the Legislature's Statement of Purpose for S.B. 1536, 
which amended§ 67-5729 and added§ 67-5733 in 1978: 
The proposed legislation also will clarify those parties entitled to join 
into an administrative appeal, and further clarifies those parties who 
have standing to initiate appeals or petitions in the state district court. 
(Emphasis added.) Notably, such clarification was necessary because the prior version of§ 67-
5729 granted standing more broadly, to any "registered vendor showing an interest. ... " But 
since the 197 8 amendment, the Legislature has decreed that only bidders have had standing to 
contest IDA's bid awards. 
As a vendor but not a bidder, Sryinga had the ability to challenge the bid specifications 
but not the actual award. Syringa did not choose to challenge those specifications, despite the 
fact that they established that the IDA might award the contract to more than one bidder. 
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b) Policy Considerations Demonstrate the Unworkability of Syringa's 
Suggested Approach. 
While the upshot of this statutory scheme may be that a subcontractor such as Syringa 
has no ability -- administrative or judicial -- to challenge a bid award, that is the result intended 
by the Legislature when it decided to grant standing for such challenges only to actual bidders. 
That is the consequence accepted by Syringa when it decided not to be a bidder itself but, rather, 
to put its eggs into ENA's basket. Moreover, Syringa could have- but chose not to- challenge 
the bid specifications making clear that the lEN contract might be awarded to multiple bidders. 
Syringa was not without a remedy in this particular instance -- it sued the bidder, ENA. 
Syringa's position- that it has standing to sue IDA because the contract award allegedly 
affected it more than a generalized member of the public- is deeply problematic, as a matter of 
policy and equity. If Syringa had its way, any entity with an interest somehow distinguishable 
from the general public would have standing to challenge bid awards in court and would have no 
requirement to first exhaust administrative remedies. Such a system would severely undermine 
the statutory and administrative scheme for challenging IDA bid awards in at least two related 
ways. 
First, Syringa's argument would, quite literally, throw open the doors to the courthouse to 
numerous additional entities who could demonstrate any form of potential injury related to a bid 
award. As a result, not only would any subcontractor have standing, but so would any potential 
subcontractor or supplier, as well as employees of the bidder, subcontractor, supplier, or 
potential subcontractor or supplier, and any other entity who could demonstrate a closer 
connection to the contract at issue than a member of the general public. The net result would be 
far more litigation over government contracts and, as a result, a dramatically increased burden on 
the state's ability to award contracts, which would be contrary to the public interest. See, e.g., 
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Groves v. Dep't oJCorr., 295 Mich. App. 1, 7 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) ("Litigation aimed at 
second-guessing the of discretion by the appropriate public officials in awarding a 
public contract will not further the public interest; it will only add uncertainty, delay, and 
expense to fulfilling the contract .... Opening the floodgates of litigation ... would serve neither 
the interests of the government nor of the citizen-taxpayers that the bidding process is designed 
to advance."); Shook Heavy & Envtl. Constr. Group v. City of Kokomo, 632 N.E.2d 355, 359 
(Ind. 1994) ("there is a clear public interest in expeditious construction of public works projects. 
Nowhere is time money more than in the construction field. And prompt completion of public 
construction projects is often important from a public safety standpoint. .... the cost of litigating 
contracts awarded under competitive bidding statutes -- perhaps multiple lawsuits in respect of a 
single contract award if more than one unsuccessful bidder seeks relief-- could pose a serious 
threat to public treasuries."). 
Second, by opening the courthouse doors, Syringa's approach would confer upon each 
tangentially related entity greater rights and abilities to challenge a bid award than the actual 
bidder itself. Under Syringa's theory, although the actual bidder-- the entity with whom IDA 
interacts and the entity most impacted by IDA's bid award-- would be required to comply with 
the administrative process under§ 67-5733 before filing suit, mere subcontractors, suppliers, 
employees and, potentially, sub-subcontractors, suppliers of subcontractors, potential contracting 
parties with subcontractors, etc., could bypass the administrative process entirely and go straight 
to the courthouse upon merely a showing that a contract award affects them more than it affects a 
member of the public at large. This would be relatively easy under Syringa's theory: any entity 
that had entered into a contract or contingent agreement with a bidder or with any of the bidder's 
subcontractors or partners or employees who could potentially receive work if the bidder 
8-
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received the government contract could meet the test for particularized injury and gain access to 
the courthouse free of the necessity for first attempting to resolve the matter with IDA. 
This result would seriously undermine the legislative intent to narrowly limit the ability 
to challenge government contracting decisions to bidders. It would also subvert the 
administrative procedures enacted to enable IDA to address, in the first instance, challenges to its 
contracting-related actions, and it would seriously burden the state's ability to enter into 
contracts. See, e.g., Sabre Constr. C01p. v. County of Fairfax, 256 Va. 68, 73 (1998) (narrowly 
interpreting section 11-70 of Virginia's Pub lie Procurement Act and holding that bidder could 
not challenge administrative body's finding that the bid was non-responsive because to do so 
"would be creating a right of action against public bodies broader than that anticipated by the 
General Assembly."). Moreover, it is supremely illogical: it makes no sense to require bidders, 
who are most impacted by government contracting decisions and with whom the IDA directly 
interacts, to pursue administrative remedies prior to gaining standing to file a complaint but grant 
unfettered access to the courtroom to those with whom IDA does not directly interact. 
The result urged by Syringa would also render superfluous I. C. § 67-5278. That section 
provides that a declaratory judgment regarding the validity or applicability "may be 
rendered whether or not the petitioner has requested the agency to pass upon the validity or 
applicability of the rule in question." Ifldaho law generally allowed any party not subject to the 
administrative process to file a declaratory judgment to challenge an administrative act, there 
would be no need for§ 67-5278. That section is necessary precisely because the Legislature has 
not otherwise authorized a party to challenge an administrative act in the courts without first 
challenging the act through the administrative channels. See Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 
149 Idaho 107, 116, 233 P.3d 38,47 (2009) ("it is not to be presumed that the legislature 
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performed an idle act of enacting a superfluous statute") (quoting Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 
568, 571-72, 798 P.2d 27, 30-31 (1990)). 
These problems illustrate that the result urged by Syringa is unworkable, in addition to 
being contrary to the statutory scheme. They also illustrate the wisdom behind the Legislature's 
decision to limit standing for challenging bid awards to the bidders themselves. Adopting 
Syringa's argument would severely undermine the statutory scheme and the IDA's ability to 
contract efficiently and cost effectively. 
B. The State Respondents are Entitled to Attorney Fees. 
Syringa asserts that Sections 12-120(3) and 12-121 do not apply in this case. Like the 
District Court, Syringa bases that assertion solely upon Potlatch's proclamation about the 
exclusivity of§ 12-117 and the post-Potlatch cases echoing the proclamation. 
Because the statement in Potlatch that "I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding 
attorney fees for the entities to which it applies," is the sole basis upon which the District Court 
denied fees to the State Respondents and the basis of Syringa's argument on appeal, the accuracy 
of Potlatch's proclamation, is squarely before this Court. Because that proclamation is not 
merely wrong, but manifestly wrong, this Court should reverse the District Court's ruling 
denying attorney fees to the State Respondents and award attorney fees at both the trial level and 
on appeal. 
1. Potlatch is Manifestly Wrong 
If Potlatch's proclamation about the exclusivity of§ 12-117 is an accurate statement of 
the law, the necessary conclusion -- and the conclusion that Syringa urges -- is that attorney fees 
cannot be awarded under any provision other than § 12-117 "in any administrative proceeding or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political subdivision and a 
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person." I.C. § 12-117 (emphasis added). As a result, it is not merely§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 
that Potlatch's proclamation would negate sub silentio, but also every other basis for awarding 
attorney fees in civil actions pitting a state agency or political subdivision against a person, 
including, to name a few, I.C. § 63-3049(d) (attorney fees for judicial review of tax commission 
rulings), I.C. § 6-918A (attorney fees under Idaho Tort Claims Act), and I. C. 9-344(2) (attorney 
fees for actions pursuant to the Idaho Public Records Act). 
This cannot be. At minimum, such a holding would be tantamount to superseding and 
negating numerous other attorney fee statutes, something this Court has acknowledged it cannot 
do. See, e.g., State v. Doe (In re Doe), 147 Idaho 326, 329, 208 P.3d 730, 733 (2009) ("We are 
not free to rewrite a statute under the guise of statutory construction."). It would also effectively 
overrule, sub silentio, numerous pre-Potlatch decisions in which this Court awarded attorney 
fees in civil actions involving state agencies pursuant to statutes other than § 12-117, including--
but not limited to--§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. See State Respondents' Opening Brief at 43-44. 
Indeed, although Syringa's entire argument regarding the State Respondents' request for 
attorney fees is premised on its assertion that the Potlatch proclamation is right, Syringa tacitly 
admits that the Potlatch Court was wrong. In fact, Syringa acknowledges, as it must, that I. C. 
§ 6-918A controls over§ 12-117. See Response at p. 43. This is consistent with the statutory 
language of§ 6-918A, which, unlike§ 12-117, actually contains an exclusivity provision: "The 
right to recover attorney fees in legal actions for money damages that come within the purview 
of this act shall be governed exclusively by the provisions ofthis act and not by any other statute 
or rule of court .... " (Emphasis added.) See Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 661 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (holding that§ 12-117 does not apply because "Section 6-918A is the exclusive 
provision for awarding attorney fees under the ITCA, including claims on appeal."). Section 12-
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11 7 has no such exclusivity provision; in fact, it has just the opposite. Instead of providing for 
exclusivity, § 12-117 actually begins by deferring to other statutes. This Court cannot write into 
§ 1 117 an exclusivity provision that the Legislature did not include. See Magic Valley 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., 138 Idaho 143, 146, 59 P .3d 314, 317 (2002) 
("we do not have the authority to rewrite the statute to include such a provision"). As 
acknowledged by Syringa, Idaho Code § 6-918A applies instead of§ 12-117 in "civil judicial 
proceedings" involving tort claims against state agencies or political subdivisions; that alone is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the Potlatch Court's statement about the exclusivity of§ 12-117 
was manifestly wrong.l 
This Court has also tacitly acknowledged that Potlatch's proclamation was wrong. In 
Henry v. Taylor,-- Idaho--, 267 P.3d 1270, 1276-1277 (2012), this Court held that§ 9-344(2) 
was the exclusive basis for an attorney fee award in a proceeding to enforce compliance with the 
Idaho Public Records Act and that, as a result, § 12-117 did not apply: 
Idaho Code section 9-344(2) sets forth the standard for awarding 
reasonable costs and attorney in actions pursuant to the Public 
Records Act. To base an award on some other statute would be 
contrary to the legislature's intent in including in the Act an attorney 
fee provision with a specified standard for awarding attorney fees in 
proceedings to enforce compliance with the Act. That statute is the 
exclusive basis for such an award. Therefore, Idaho Code sections 12-
117 and 12-121 do not apply. 
It goes without saying that Henry cannot be correct unless Potlach was wrong. 
3 When the Legislature actually intends to make § 12-120(3) inapplicable, it has done so 
expressly. See Primary Health Network v. Dep't of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 670, 52 P.3d 307, 
314 (2002) (quoting I.C. § 49-1839(4), which stated, at that time "Section 12-120, Idaho 
Code, shall not apply to any actions involving insureds and insurers ... "). Of course, § 12-
117 has no such provision. 
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There are numerous additional reasons that Potlatch's proclamation was manifestly 
wrong. As set forth in the State Respondents' opening brief, Potlatch ignored the "unless 
otherwise provided" language in § 12-117 as well as the express intent of the Legislature that 
§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 be applicable to state agencies, as evidenced by the statutory definition 
of "party" in each. See State Respondents' Opening Brief at 42-43. Before Potlatch, this Court 
had routinely upheld and granted attorney fees in cases involving "the entities to which[§ 12-
117] applies" pursuant to provisions other than§ 12-117, see, e.g., id. at 43-44 (citing cases), 
including as recently as the 2009, the year before Potlatch. See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 
Idaho 656, 664-65, 201 P.3d 629, 637-38 (2009) (holding that district court did not err in 
awarding attorney fees pursuant to§ 12-120(3)).1 The Potlach Court ignored all of this. That 
Court ignored the statutory definition of"party" in§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 and the exclusivity 
provision in§ 6-918A. It also ignored the "unless otherwise provided" language in§ 12-117; in 
fact, it omitted such language from its quotation of that section. 
To be clear, the Potlatch Court made an unnecessarily broad statement that, if given 
effect, would negate numerous other statutes and numerous prior decisions of this Court. 
4 Although there were also two older cases in which this Court had stated that § 12-117 was 
exclusive, in both of those cases, this Court stated merely that § 12-117 was the exclusive 
provision for awarding fees against a state agency. Westway Constr., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. 
Dep't, 139 Idaho 107, 116, 73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003) and State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997). Moreover, the Westway court's 
terse analysis simply stated that section 12-117 is the "exclusive" basis for awarding attorney 
fees against government entities, and it cited only Hagerman for that proposition. Hagerman 
was decided before the 2000 amendment to section 12-117, which added an "[u]nless 
otherwise provided by statute" qualification to the applicability of section 12-117. Westway 
(like Potlatch) fails to discuss that important statutory language at all, much less to explain 
why section 12-120(3) is not a statute that "otherwise provide[s]" for awards of attorney fees 




Moreover, that Court did so without any analysis or reasoning, by ignoring the language of other 
attorney fee statutes and its own prior decisions giving them effect, and through selective 
quotation of§ 12-117 and selective reliance on outlying cases. If the Court had really intended 
to work such a fundamental change in the law, it needed to do more than that: this Court is not at 
liberty to disregard and negate numerous other statutes, let alone to do so sub silentio. See, e.g., 
Rogers v. Household Life Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 735, 739, 250 P.3d 786, 790 (2011) ("This Court 
may not ignore or amend unambiguous statutes"). Potlatch's proclamation was manifestly 
wrong, and it needs to be corrected by this Court. 
2. Syringa's Arguments in Response Lack Merit. 
Syringa's response suffers from numerous additional infirmities beyond being based 
upon a false premise -- that this Court should defer to Potlatch's proclamation. Most 
fundamentally, Syringa's response utterly fails to address the State Respondents' primary 
argument demonstrating that Potlatch was manifestly incorrect -- the unambiguous statutory 
language of§ 12-120(3), which makes it irrefutably clear that the statute applies to state 
agencies. Like the Potlatch Court, Syringa neither acknowledges nor attempts to explain away 
the clear language of§ 12-120(3). This is the "obvious principle of law" at stake here-- that this 
Court is not free to disregard the unambiguous language of§ 12-120(3), let alone to mmounce a 
rule oflaw that would effectively rewrite that statute as well as numerous other statutes and prior 
decisions and undermine the clear Legislative intent. 
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a) Post-Potlatch Case Law Demonstrates Only that Potlatch Has 
Destablized the Jurisprudence and Introduced Uncertainty into 
Attorney Fee Requests. 
Syringa claims that the six cases that have cited or quoted Potlatch's proclamation "settle 
the matter." Response at 39. But in none of those cases did this Court engage in any analysis of 
whether Potlatch's proclamation was correct. Indeed, each ofthe six merely echoes Potlatch 
without addressing its enor. This Court has "stated frequently that we will not follow prior 
incorrect decisions merely because the cases exist." Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). Because those decisions represent no more 
than "blindly following" Potlatch, id., they do not cure the manifest error of the Potlatch court 
and are entitled to little consideration: "when the judicial interpretation of a statute is manifestly 
wrong, stare decisis does not require that we continue an incorrect reading of the statute." Id.J.. 
Moreover, whatever minimal force those decisions might otherwise have is undermined 
by the post-Potlatch decisions from this Court awarding.2 or evaluating whether to award1 
5 Syringa asserts that this Court refused to overrule Potlatch in Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 
Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916, 926 (2011), and that such refusal means that the State Respondents 
are "doubly barred" by stare decisis. Response at 41. Syringa overlooks the fact that 
Sopatyk concerned a different issue -- namely, whether Smith v. Washington County was 
correctly decided as to attorney fees in administrative appeals. That holding has no 
application here, where the issue is attorney fees in a..::.::...;.=....;:==· 
2 Syringa avers that the State Respondents "incorrectly contend" that this Court awarded 
attorney fees to the Hagerman Highway District pursuant to§ 12-121 in Zingiber Investment, 
LLC v. Hagerman Highway District, 150 Idaho 675, 249 P.3d 868 (2011). Not so. Syringa 
cites a portion of that opinion in which this court awarded attorney fees to Hagerman 
Highway District pursuant to § 12-117. But Syringa somehow overlooks the fact that the 
Court also awarded attorney to Hagerman Highway District pursuant to § 12-121. Id. at 
687, 249 P.3d at 880 ("this Court also awards attorney fees on appeal to the District. .. under 
I.C. § 12-121"). Indeed, the fact that this Court awarded attorney fees under both§ 12-117 
and§ 12-121 undermines Syringa's argument that the two statutes conflict. See also Harris 
v. State ex ref. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 406-407, 210 P.3d 86, 91-92 (2009) (evaluating 
whether to award attorney fees under both§ 12-117 and§ 12-121); Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. 
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attorney fees under provisions other than § 12-117 in cases where § 12-117 could apply.~ 
See State Respondents' Opening Brief at 44 (citing cases )2.. Moreover, Syringa has not 
cited a single case where a court has held that § 12-120(3) no longer applies in the 
circumstances at issue here -- a fee request by a state agency or political subdivision 
pursuant to § 12-120(3). 
Ultimately, the final tally of post-Potlatch decisions is less important than what those 
decisions reveal: that the law is, at the moment, unsettled, and that the Court has, on multiple 
z 
8 
v. Boundary County, 138 Idaho 534, 537, 66 P.3d 238, 241 (2003) (same); Clark v. Dep't of 
Health & Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d 988, 993(2000) (same). 
Syringa contends that Stoddard v. Pocatello School Dist. #25, 149 Idaho 679, 687, 239 P.3d 
784, 792-93 (20 1 0) "does not conflict with Potlatch" because in that case this Court declined 
to award fees under § 12-121. Response at 44, n.l2. But the salient point is that the Court 
evaluated whether fees should be awarded pursuant to § 12-121, not § 12-117, and its 
decision not to award fees was based on the merits of the claim under § 12-121, not on any 
supposed preemption by § 12-117. In other words, the Stoddard Court applied § 12-121, in 
contravention to Potlatch's proclamation. 
Syringa's argument that Potlatch's proclamation was not dicta misses the point. An 
expression of opinion on a question not before the Court is dictum. Long v. State Ins. Fund, 
60 Idaho 257, 260-261 (1939). In Potlatch, the Court was presented only with claims for 
attorney fees under§§ 1 117 and 12-121; as a result, its proclamation about the exclusivity 
of § 12-117 was overbroad and therefore dictum as to any provision other than § 12-117. 
\Vhether the Potlatch proclamation was dictum is, however, ultimately of little consequence. 
Because the Court made that statement, and, as Syringa points out, it has been echoed in 
subsequent decisions, the underlying accuracy of it needs to be substantively addressed 
regardless of whether it was dictum. And regardless of how it is addressed, the result is the 
same: if the Potlatch proclamation was dictum with regard to provisions other than§ 12-121, 
this Court can simply clarify its overbreadth; if it was "a holding establishing binding 
precedent on a question oflaw," this Court should correct it because it is "manifestly wrong." 
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,-- Idaho--, 272 P.3d 467, 473 (2012) . 
.2 Since the State Respondents filed their Opening Brief, this Court has continued to evaluate or 
award attorney fees under provisions other than § 12-117 in cases where that section could 
apply. See Pioneer Irrigation Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 110, 25-26 (Idaho 
Apr. 27, 20 12) (evaluating whether to award attorney fees under § § 12-117 and 12-121 ); 
Hart v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 99, 13-14 (Idaho Apr. 26, 2012) 
(awarding attorney fees to State Tax Commission pursuant to I.C. § 63-3409(d)). 
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occasions since Potlatch, awarded fees or evaluated whether to award fees pursuant to attorney 
fee provisions other than§ 12-117 in situations where§ 12-117 applies. In the face ofthis 
unsettled post-Potlatch law, Syringa's argument against reexamining the issue crumbles. 
Syringa argues that this Court should not revisit or overrule Potlatch because it is "a settled point 
oflaw" and to do so would be "to embrace ambiguity over order." Response at 40-41 (citing 
Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 579, 237 P.3d 1200, 1205 (2010)). But with multiple 
post-Potlatch decisions from this Court awarding attorney fees pursuant to provisions other than 
§ 12-117, the present state of the law is ambiguity, not the "order" that the Fuhriman Court 
cautioned against disturbing. Indeed, Potlatch itself caused the ambiguity. Prior to that decision, 
the "order" that Syringa lauds was in place. There was no dispute whether, in a civil action, a 
state agency could recover attorney fees under§ 12-120(3). The ambiguity that presently exists 
in the law is the result of Potlatch's declaration. 
As a result, Syringa's argument against revisting Potlatch actually further illustrates why 
this Court must revisit -- and overrule or clarify-- Potlatch. Simply put, Potlatch is the problem. 
Potlatch violated the principles of stare decisis, not merely by purporting to make new law 
contrary to precedent, but by doing so sub silentio, absent any reasoning or authority in support, 
let alone any attempt to explain the obvious tension with the statutory language. Potlatch 
destabilized the law by introducing a new element of uncertainty about attorney fee awards to 
prevailing state agencies -- an uncertainty reflected in the contradictory results in post-Potlatch 
decisions. Indeed, neither Potlatch nor Syringa cites any case decided prior to Potlatch holding 
that§ 12-117 precludes the application of any other attorney fee provision in a case involving a 
- 17-
01152.0105.5082477.2 
prevailing state agency. Prior to Potlatch, there was no ambiguity in the law regarding attorney 
fees for prevailing state agencies. That was settled law.1 0 
b) Syringa's Arguments that Potlatch is not Manifestly Wrong are 
Misguided and Ineffectual. 
Syringa asserts that Potlatch is not manifestly incorrect. But Syringa's arguments in 
support are ineffectual and suffer from three serious deficiencies. 
First, Syringa fails to address the statutory language of§ 12-120(3) making clear that the 
Legislature intended that section to apply to state agencies. Indeed, Syringa completely ignores 
the State Respondents' primary argument demonstrating Potlatch's error, that the Legislature 
defined "party" to include state agencies because it intended that § 12-120(3) would apply to 
state agencies. And the "obvious principle of law or justice" that Syringa claims is lacking is the 
principle identified by the State Respondents in their opening brief: the Court cannot rewrite a 
statute, let alone rewrite multiple statutes. In other words, the Court cannot rewrite § 12-117 to 
add an exclusivity provision that the Legislature excluded -- let alone rewrite the exclusivity 
provision put of§ 6-918A. Nor can it rewrite§ 12-120(3) or§ 12-121 to make either 
inapplicable to state agencies in the face of the express language making them so applicable. 
Second, Syringa conflates §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 and purports to address the former 
while in reality addressing only the latter. For this reason, to the extent that Syringa's arguments 
have any force, they do so only with respect to§ 12-121, not to§ 12-120(3). 
10 In its eagerness to prop up Potlatch, Syringa attributes to that Court a nonexistent "rationale." 
Response at 40. According to Syringa, "the [Potlatch] Court's rationale was clear: 'I.C. 
§ 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney's fees for the entities to which it 
applies."' This, however, is no more than a declaratory statement, completely devoid of any 
rationale. And that is precisely the point: the Potlatch Court purported to announce a 
completely new rule of law -- a rule contrary to the express language of numerous statutes 
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Syringa's argument about the resolution of conflicting statutes is emblematic of the 
degree to which it conflates §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. Syringa claims that "the State 
Respondents' proposed interpretation would render either§ 12-121 or the relevant section of 
§ 12-117 duplicative and superfluous," but it fails to explain how, even if correct, that argument 
would apply to§ 12-120(3), which does not apply to frivolous litigation Response at 42. 
Syringa begrudgingly admits that§ 12-120(3) allows fees in favor of a public entity. Response 
at 42. But Syringa's argument that§ 12-117 controls over§ 12-120(3) is premised upon the 
unsupported-- and incorrect-- assertion that §§ 12-117 and 12-120(3) conflict. Syringa fails to 
explain how there is any conflict between a statute that permits fee awards in cases involving 
commercial transactions and contract disputes ( § 12-120(3)) and a statute that addresses 
awards for frivolous litigation(§ 12-117). Small wonder, because there is no such conflict: the 
two apply to different situations and for different reasons. 
Indeed, this Court has evaluated attorney fee requests under both §§ 12-117 and 12-
120(3) in the same case something the Court would presumably refrain from doing ifthe two 
actually conflicted. See, e.g., Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 191 P.3d 205, 216 
(2008). In reality, the only apparent conflict is between the unnecessarily broad Potlatch 
statement about the exclusivity of§ 12-117 and the clear language of§ 12-120(3). That is not a 
conflict between statutes at all. Rather, it is a conflict that, rather than buttressing Potlatch's 
proclamation, actually further illustrates that it is erroroneous. 
Syringa's attempt to divine the "mind" of the Legislature, and its conclusion therefrom, 
suffers from the same defect. Even assuming, arguendo, that Syringa was correct in its 
and prior Court decisions -- without any rationale in support. 
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divination of the "mind" of the Legislature, i.e., that§ 12-117 is the "exclusive means by which a 
public agency could obtain for frivolous litigation," that would apply only to§ 12-121, not 
to § 12-120(3). In other words, Syringa's argument about the Legislature's "mind" fails on its 
own terms because, even if correct, it would establish only that § 12-117 was meant to displace 
other statutes addressing attorney for frivolous litigation, not those addressing other 
circumstances. For this same reason, Syringa's argument about the "duplicative and superfluous" 
effect of applying§§ 12-117 and 12-121 gets it nowhere. Even ifthat argument was correct, it 
would lead only to the conclusion that § 12-117 preempted § 12-121, not that it also preempts 
§ 12-120(3) or any other attorney fee statute. As a result, these arguments fail to demonstrate 
that Potlatch 's proclamation was not manifestly incorrect; at most, they might suggest that it 
might not have been manifestly incorrect with respect~~=-"'-=::..· 
Third, Syringa's argument is inherently self-contradictory. Syringa offers an alternative 
interpretation for the prefatory language of§ 12-117 ("Unless otherwise provided by statute ... "), 
one that attempts to explain away the inconsistency between that language and Potlatch's 
proclamation by suggesting that it was meant to defer to attorney provisions such as § 6-
918A. But, as discussed above, by conceding that § 12-117 is not exclusive, Syringa's 
explanation is in fact a concession that Potlatch is wrong. 
Potlatch's proclamation was and is manifestly wrong. Syringa's arguments do nothing to 
change that conclusion. At most, they offer some support for the notion that if the Potlatch Court 
had merely stated that § 12-11 7 preempts § 12-121, such a statement might not have been 
manifestly wrong. But that is not what the Potlatch court said -- if its proclamation had been so 
limited, there would be no question that the State Respondents would be entitled to attorney fees 
under § 12-120(3 ). Rather, the Potlatch court made an expansive statement that, if given effect, 
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would effectively rewrite or negate numerous other statutes and, by doing so, undermine the 
Legislature's intent in adopting the various attorney fee provisions. This the Court cannot do. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Syringa lacks standing to bring counts two and three, and the 
State Respondents are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to § 12-120(3) and/ or § 12-121.11 As a 
result, this Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of counts two and three but reverse 
the District Court's determination that the State Respondents were not entitled to attorney fees, 
remand for a determination of such fees, and award the State Respondents attorney fees for this 
appeal. 
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